A (TU) cooperative game is extendable (Kikuta and Shapley, 1986) if every core allocation of each sub-game can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its sub-games can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core (Sharkey, 1982) . Further, we characterize extendability in terms of an extension of the balanced cover of the game. It is also shown how this extension can unify the analysis of many families of games under one roof.
Introduction
The purpose of this note is twofold. It is first intended to study a property of TU cooperative games (games, henceforth) called extendability. A game is extendable if every core allocation of each sub-game can be extended to a core allocation of the game. This concept originates in an unpublished paper of Kikuta and Shapley (1986) and was further investigated by van Gellekom et al. (1999) . Our main result characterizes extendable games. Furthermore, we introduce a stronger notion of extendability and show that it is equivalent to largeness of the core (Sharkey, 1982) .
Extendability is an important property when the set of players is dynamic and different players join the game at different times. Assume that a group of veterans is involved in a game-like situation and that a core allocation has been established. When a group of rookies is joining the game a core allocation of the expanded game needs to be chosen. If the new game is not extendable, then it might be necessary to change the allocation of the veterans, possibly reducing the payoffs to some of them. Extendability guarantees that one can find a new core allocation that does not harm any of the veterans.
Our second aim is to show how various families of games can be characterized in terms of a certain function, called the concavification of the game. Viewed geometrically, the domain of a game v is the vertices of the unit cube. Rather than restricting attention to the vertices, we consider the entire cube and refer to the minimal concave and homogeneous function which is greater than or equal to v 1 . This function coincides with the totally balanced cover of v on the vertices of the cube. Balancedness and totally balancedness, convexity, exactness, largeness of the core and extendability can all, quite effortlessly, be characterized in terms of this extension. As a consequence, the hierarchy among these properties becomes clearly apparent.
Since our extension of the balanced cover is homogeneous it is uniquely determined by its values on the unit simplex. We find it more convenient to restrict attention to the simplex rather than considering the entire cube. We therefore identify each coalition with the uniform distribution over its members and not with the corresponding characteristic vector. The characteristic function describes the per capita value of each coalition rather than the total worth of a coalition.
This 'normalized version' of a game might be seen dispensable. However, two arguments justify its use. First, when working in the simplex the point corresponding to the grand coalition becomes an interior point of the domain. This fact is important in the proof of our characterization of extendability (Theorem 1). Second, the dimension of the domain is reduced by 1. This makes the geometry simpler and the proofs more visible. For instance, Lemma 2, which is essentially the Shapley-Bondareva theorem (Shapley, 1967 and Bondareva, 1962) , becomes very intuitive when presented in this way 2 .
In the following section we provide an example to motivate the study of the extendability property. In Section 3 we formally define the normalized game and the extension of the balanced cover to the unit simplex. Section 4 discusses the properties of convexity, exactness and largeness of the core. Some of the results in this section are variants of already known facts. The proofs are omitted whenever this is the case. In Section 5 extendability is investigated. Some of the proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Pricing in public enterprizes: An example
The following application of cooperative game theory is adopted from Faulhaber (1975) . A publicly owned (or a privately owned and publicly regulated) enterprize produces and sells a set T of different products. Possible examples include a railway company selling tickets to various destinations, a communication company providing long and short distance calls as well as internet connection, and a dam maintenance company providing flood control, water for irrigation and electric power. For every subset R ⊆ T , the cost of providing the required demands only for the products in R is given by v(R).
For equity reasons, public policy makers would like to design a pricing scheme that keeps a balanced budget and is subsidy-free. The first means that the total revenue, i∈T x i , is equal to the total cost, v(T ). The latter means that i∈R x i ≤ v(R) for every R ⊆ T . This implies that no subset of products subsidies the rest. In terms of cooperative game theory the vector {−x i } i∈T is in the core of the game −v. Now, assume that the enterprize considers an expansion of its services and to provide a new set of products, S, in addition to T . The domain of the function v is extended to all
The notion of extendability, which is the main theme of this note, refers to the relation between the original v, defined over the restricted domain, T , and its extension to the grand domain, N . When the new game (N, −v) is extendable it is possible to find a pricing scheme
In other words, extendability of −v enables one to introduce a pricing scheme for the large set of products that maintains the balanced budget the subsidy-free properties, while keeping the prices of the products in T unchanged. In particular, expanding the menu of services provided does not force a price increase of any of the original services in T .
On the other hand, if the game (N, −v) is not extendable, then it might be that every core allocation y of this game has some product i ∈ T that needs to become more expensive (i.e., y i > x i ). Policy makers will have to raise the price of some products in T , which is likely to lead consumers of the products that are about to become more expensive to object to the proposed expansion. This might make the reform harder to implement. This is why extendability is an essential characteristic of a game.
Preliminaries
A game with player set
non-empty coalition then the sub-game of v, with respect to the coalition S, is a cooperative game v S , where the grand coalition is S and v S (T ) = v(T ) for every T ⊆ S. We denote by
where, for every coalition R ⊆ N , e R ∈ IR N is the vector whose i'th coordinate equals 1 if i ∈ R and 0 otherwise.
For a given game v, the totally balanced cover of v is the gamev (with the same player set
, where the maximum is taken over all balanced collections for the coalition S. A game v is called balanced ifv(N ) = v(N ) and totally balanced ifv(S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N . It is well known (see Shapley 1967 and Bondareva, 1962 ) that v has a non-empty core iff it is balanced and that every sub-game of v has a non-empty core iff v is totally balanced.
We denote by ∆ the unit simplex of IR Lemma 1 For every q ∈ ∆, Proof. To prove (a), assume first that v has a non-empty core and let x ∈ C(v). Consider the linear (and in particular concave) function on ∆ defined by f (q) = x · q. Since x is in the core, for every non-empty coalition
3 For every two vectors a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and
In order to prove the inverse direction, assume that cavv(c N ) =v(c N ). Since cavv is concave, it has a linear support, say x, at the point c N . By assumption,
, which implies x(S) ≥ v(S).
Therefore, x ∈ C(v) which proves (a). (b) follows from the proof of (a).
Remark 3 A similar characterization of balanced games appears in Branzei and Tijs (2001) . Here, however, it is related to the concavification operator.
4 Convexity, exactness and large cores
Convex games Definition 3 (Shapley 1971) The game v is convex if for any two coalitions S and T , v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ).
A first characterization of convex games via cavv appears in the following proposition. Weber (1994, Section 9, pages 1295-1297) has a similar result. We omit the proof.
Proposition 1 A game v is convex iff, for every pair of non-empty coalitions S, T such that T ⊆ S, the line segment connecting the points (c S ,v(c S )) and (c T ,v(c T )) is on the graph of cavv.
We next provide another characterization of convex games. This is done by an explicit description of cavv when the game is convex. The proof of the proposition can be rather easily obtained from the results of Delbaen (1974, Lemma 2, pp. 214-215) or Lovasz (1983, pp. 246-249) and is therefore omitted. We first need some notation. 
Exact games Definition 4 (Schmeidler, 1972) The game v is exact if, for every coalition S, there is x ∈ C(v) such that v(S) = x(S).
Proposition 3 A game v is exact iff, for every non-empty coalition S, the line segment connecting the points (c S ,v(c S )) and (c N ,v(c N ) ) is on the graph of cavv.
Proposition 3 is a variant of a result in Weber (1994 Weber ( , section 9, pages 1295 Weber ( -1297 . The proof is omitted. A simple consequence is the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let v be a totally balanced game. Then v is exact iff cavv(c
S ) = min{x·c S ; x ∈ C(v)} for every S ⊆ N .
Games with a large core
Definition 5 (Sharkey, 1982) v has a large core if for every y ∈ U (v) there exists x ∈ C (v) such that x ≤ y.
Proposition 4 v has a large core iff cavv(q)
Proposition 4 will follow from Lemma 4 which is a consequence of Lemma 3. The proofs of these lemmas are deferred to the Appendix. In Ichiishi (1990 (ii) For every q ∈ A there is y ∈ H such that y · q = f (q) and y · q ≥ f (q ) for every q ∈ A (the hyperplanes defined by the vectors in H support the entire graph of f ).
Let q 0 be in the interior of A and assume that x ∈ IR n is a linear support for f at q 0 .
Then x ∈ H.
Lemma 4 Let A = ∆, and let f and H be as in the previous lemma. Assume that q 0 is in the relative interior of ∆ and that x is a linear support for f at q 0 . Then, x ∈ H.
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume first that v has a large core and fix q ∈ ∆. By Lemma
Now, let y be a linear support of cavv at the point q. Then, y ∈ U (v) and, since v has a large core, there is x ∈ C(v) such that x ≤ y. Since x is in C(v), cavv(q) ≤ x · q and since x ≤ y, cavv(q) = y · q ≥ x · q. It follows that x · q = cavv(q), and therefore,
Conversely, assume that cavv(q) = min{x · q; x ∈ C(v)} and let y ∈ U (v). Obviously, y · q ≥ cavv(q) for every q ∈ ∆. Therefore, there is x ≤ y such that x is a linear support of cavv at some point q ∈ ∆. Moreover, x can be chosen in a way that it supports cavv at a point q in the relative interior of ∆. We can thus apply Lemma 4, where (in the lemma's notation) A = ∆, f = cavv, H = C(v), and q 0 = q. It follows that x ∈ C(v) and x ≤ y.
Extendable games

Extendability
We denote by C S (v) the projection of C(v) to the subspace corresponding to the coalition
Extendability was introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986) and named by van Gellekom et al. (1999) .
Theorem 1 Let v be a totally balanced game. Then, v is extendable iff there is
Proof. Assume first that v is extendable. Since cavv is piece-wise linear, for every S ⊆ N one can find a small enough number δ S > 0 such that for every q ∈ ∆ S with |q − c S | < δ S and for every 0
there is x ∈ IR S which is a linear support of the restriction of cavv to ∆ S at both points c S and q. Since v is totally balanced, and by Lemma 2 (b), x ∈ C(v S ). Thus, by assumption, we can extend x to a core vector of the game v, sayx. Obviously,x · q = x · q = cavv(q).
Conversely, assume that x ∈ C(v S ) for some S ⊆ N . Then, x is a linear support of the restriction of cavv to ∆ S at the point c S . The set C S (v) is closed and convex. Moreover, by assumption, for every q ∈ ∆ S sufficiently close to c S there is y ∈ C S (v), which is a linear support of the restriction of cavv to ∆ S at q. Thus, we may apply Lemma 4 and deduce that x ∈ C S (v). 
Strong extendability
Definition 8 v is strongly extendable if, for every coalition S and a minimal y ∈ U (v S ),
Lemma 5 If v is strongly extendable, then it is extendable.
Proof. This is obvious since if y ∈ C(v S ), then it is minimal in U (v S ).
Theorem 2 v is strongly extendable iff it has a large core.
Proof. Suppose that v has a large core and let y ∈ U (v S ) be minimal. One can extend y to a vector, say z, in U (v). Since v has a large core, there is x ∈ C(v) such that x ≤ z. Thus, x S , the restriction of x to ∆ S , satisfies x S ≤ y. By the minimality of y, x S = y.
As for the converse, assume that v is strongly extendable. We use Proposition 4 and show that cavv(q) = min{x · q; x ∈ C(v)} for every q ∈ ∆. Since cavv is concave, it is sufficient to show that for every S N and for every q ∈ ∆ S , cavv(q) = min{x · q; x ∈ C(v)}.
Moreover, since cavv is continuous, it is sufficient to show it for every S N and for every point q in the relative interior of ∆ S .
Let S N and q be a relative interior point of ∆ S (i.e., q i > 0 for every i ∈ S). The function cavv S is concave, and as such it has a support at q. Denote this support by y.
In particular, y ∈ U (v S ) and y · q = cavv S (q). Since all the coordinates of q are positive, it implies that y is minimal. By assumption, y ∈ C S (v). It means that there is x ∈ C(v) whose restriction to ∆ S coincides with y. Thus, x · q = y · q = cavv S (q). This shows that min{x · q; x ∈ C(v)} ≤ cavv S (q). Since always min{x · q; x ∈ C(v)} ≥ cavv S (q), the desired equality is proven.
separation theorem, there is 0 = p ∈ IR n such that p · x > max{p · y; y ∈ H}. Since q 0 is in the interior of A, one can find a small enough δ > 0 such that q 0 − δp ∈ A. Let y ∈ H be a linear support of f at q 0 and let z ∈ H be a linear support for f at q 0 − δp. Then,
It follows that there is 0 < α ≤ 1 such that
Denote w = αz + (1 − α)y ∈ H. It follows that
However, (2) and (3) contradict each other. Therefore, x ∈ H.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Consider the homogeneous extension of f to IR 
